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INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial family law topics is the issue of child
custody relocation. Relocation litigation' addresses the ability of a custodial parent to move with minor children to a different state, away from the
non-custodial parent. 2 A number of social factors have converged to bring
relocation litigation to the forefront. Roughly one half of marriages in the
United States end in divorce, 3 with more than 1.1 million couples filing for

1. The term relocation litigation, for the purpose of this comment, is used to describe cases dealing with a custodial parent's ability to relocate with minor children to a
different state over the objection of a non-custodial parent. Scholarship addressing relocation litigation, as well as some state statutes, frequently use the terms "relocation" and "removal" interchangeably. There is no distinction between the two terms as used hereinafter.
See Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the Best Interests Analysis in New
2.
York Relocation Cases?, 15 PACE L. REv. 339, 340 (1995) (using a similar definition of
relocation litigation "in its most elemental form.").
Rose M. Kreider & Jason M. Fields, NUMBER, TIMING AND DURATION OF
3.
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divorce yearly.4 It is further estimated that half of divorcing couples have
minor children.5 In 2002, approximately twenty million children lived in
single-parent households.6 In addition to high divorce rates and an increase
in single-parent households, American society is more mobile than ever.
Roughly forty-four percent of the United States population changed residences during the five-year period from 1990 to 1995. 7 Moreover, about
twenty percent of American families relocated to a different state during
that period. The combination of high divorce rates and high mobility has
led to increased judicial and legislative scrutiny in the area of relocation. 9
Relocation cases present difficult problems for family court judges, as
they are often highly charged, emotional proceedings with little prospect of
amicable resolution.' 0 Furthermore, relocation cases inherently have life
changing consequences for both the litigants/parents and their children."
As with most areas of family law, state law provides the controlling authority for removal actions. The formulation of laws pertaining to relocation
requires state lawmakers to balance a variety of interests, most notably
those of the custodial parent, the non-custodial parent, and the minor children.' 2 Balancing these competing interests requires state lawmaking bod-

DIVORCES: 1996, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 2 (Febmary 2002) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p.70-80.pdf. (last visited
Feb. 8, 2005).
4.
Id.
5.
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 34 U. LOuiSVILLE J. OFFAM. L. 1, 2 (1995-96).
6.
Jason Fields, CHILDREN'S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS:
March 2002, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 2 (Table 1) (June 2003),
availableat http:/www.census.govlprod/2003pubslp2O-547(last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
7.
Jason P. Schacter, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 2 (Table 1) (Sept. 2000) availableat
http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p23-200.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
8.
Id.
9.
Lucy S. McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision Making, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291, 292 (2003) (stating that "[rielocation continues to
be the subject of commentary and law reform around the globe.").
10.
See William G. Austin, RelocationLaw and the Threshold of Harm: Integrating
Legal and Behavioral Perspectives,34 FAM. L.Q. 63, 63-64 (2000) (stating that relocation
cases will usually be litigated only where there are two highly involved parents in a child's
life, thus making decisions difficult). See also Judge Thomas A. James, Jr., Custody Relocation Law in Pennsylvania: Time to Revisit and Revise Gruber v. Gruber, 107 DICK. L.
REV. 45, 73 (2002) (stating the proposition that custody relocation cases are difficult to
resolve amicably due to emotions of parties and high stakes for minor children).
11.
McGough, supra note 9, at 302-03.
12.
Some of the federal constitutional rights which are implicated in relocation
cases include the custodial parent's right to travel and to marry, as well as the non-custodial
parent's right to a relationship with his/her child. See LaFrance, supra note 5, at 1 (providMARRIAGES AND
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ies to consider not only the desired public policy of the state with regard to
the exercise of3 its parens patriae powers, but federal constitutional concerns as well.1
State legislatures have addressed the competing interests at stake in relocation cases by requiring courts to apply the best interests of the child
standard.' 4 Under this standard, a custodial parent is allowed to relocate
with a minor child upon a determination that such relocation is in the best
interests of the child. While states are consistent in their adherence to the
best interests standard, they take divergent approaches to determining when
relocation is in a child's best interests. 15 Thus, substantive state laws governing relocation differ greatly in terms of statutory guidelines, judicial
6
presumptions, and allocation of the burden of proof.' Even within a particular jurisdiction where courts purportedly apply the same standards for
removal, the individualized nature of child custody proceedings and the
broad deference given to family court jud Aes can often result in an ambiguous body of case law for removal actions.
In Illinois, a custodial parent's ability to relocate to a different state
with their minor child is governed by section 609 of the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA).' 8 Section 609 provides that
"the court may grant leave, before or after judgment, to any party having
custody of a minor child or children to remove such child or children from
the state of Illinois, whenever such approval is in the best interests of such

ing an in depth analysis of federal constitutional issues that are affected in relocation cases).
See also Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases as Change in Custody Proceedings: "Judicial Blackmail" or Competing Interests Reconciled, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885, 886 (2000)
(addressing competing legal interests in relocation cases). See generally Donald C. Hubin,
ParentalRights and Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 123 (1999).
See generally LaFrance, supra note 5, at 66 (beginning an analysis of relocation
13.
in a constitutional context).
McGough, supra note 9, at 303 (stating that "[a]ll states [and several foreign
14.
jurisdictions] use the best interests of the child as the touchstone for all child custody cases,
including relocation disputes.").
See Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving Backward,
15.
31 TEx. TECH L. REv. 983, 986 (2000) (examining whether relocation is favored or disfavored among the states).
See McGough, supra note 9, at 303-19 (describing four approaches taken by
16.
various states, reflecting divergent allocations of the burden of proof and presumptions in
relocation actions). See also James, supra note 10, at 62.
See generally Carl W. Gilmore & Gunnar J. Gitlin, Post-Eckert Trends in Child
17.
Removal: A Review of Appellate Cases, 84 ILL. B.J. 76 (1996) (illustrating the disparate
results among Illinois appellate courts in removal cases, even though the courts were purportedly following the same guidelines).
18.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609(a) (2002).
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child or children."' 9 The statute further provides that "the burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of such child or children is on
the party seeking removal., 20 However, section 609 does not set forth any
specific guidelines for determining when relocation is in the best interests
of the child. 2' Thus, the development and application of standards for allowing relocation has been left to case precedent. The reliance on case
precedent has proven troublesome, as Illinois courts have taken divergent,
and often inconsistent approaches to best interest determinations in relocation actions.22
The Illinois General Assembly should address the issue of relocation
in the same careful and specific manner as other aspects of the marriage
dissolution and custody process. The possibility of a custodial parent relocating with minor children pervasively affects multiple aspects of the marriage dissolution and child custody process, and the absence of statutory
guidelines for best interests determinations in the context of removal increases the potential for resolutions that frustrate, as opposed to serve, the
best interests of the child.23

This article calls for the amendment of the IMDMA's provisions on
interstate relocation with minor children to include specific guidelines to
guide trial courts in making best interests determinations. After briefly
examining national trends and theories in relocation litigation, the article
details the development of the law pertaining to relocation in Illinois by
examining early case precedents, the enactment of the removal statute, and
the body of case law interpreting section 609, with particular focus on the
recent Illinois Supreme Court decision In re Marriage of Collingbourne.
The article then examines the contours of relocation law in Illinois, pointing out the undesirable consequences that have resulted from a lack of
statutory guidance. The article concludes by calling for amendments to
section 609 that provide specific guidelines for courts to employ in determining whether or not a proposed relocation by a custodial parent serves
the best interests of the child.

19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
See Gilmore & Gitlin, supra note 17, at 76. See also H. Joseph Gitlin, Removal: The Still Evolving Standard, 93 ILL. B.J. 46 (2005).
23.
In an effort to clarify removal guidelines, some states have adopted rather extensive relocation statutes. See, e.g., W.VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-403 (Michie 2004); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-408 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
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II.

NATIONAL APPROACHES TO CUSTODY RELOCATION

On a national level, courts and legislatures have taken divergent approaches to the issue of relocation. 24 There is some indication that the majority trend among the states is to favor relocation, while the minority view
favors the non-custodial parent's right to contest relocation.25 However,
there is by no means an overwhelming general sentiment in either direction. 26 A more precise analysis shows that states take four general approaches toward relocation. 27 Some states follow the "real advantage" approach, and require the custodial parent to demonstrate a significant benefit
to himself/herself and the child as a result of the move.28 A second group
of states have a presumption in favor of the relocating parent, which can be
overcome only upon a showing by the non-custodial parent that the proposed relocation will endanger the child's health and well-being, or that the
purpose of the relocation is to interfere with visitation.29 In a third group of
states, the custodial parent has the burden of showing that the proposed
relocation is in the child's best interests.30 Finally, a fourth group of states
have adopted a pure best interest analysis with no presumptions or allocation of the burden of proof.31 Of these four approaches, it appears that the
"pure best interest" test is becoming the predominant trend.32
One area where state courts have been consistent is in their reluctance
to decide relocation cases on the basis of the federal constitutional rights of

24.

See Charles P. Kindregan, Family Interests in Competition: Relocation and

Visitation, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 56-61 (2002) (detailing different approaches with
respect to the existence and scope of state relocation statutes and finding it "remarkable"
that states have expressed little or no interest in developing uniform relocation laws).
Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 222 (N.J. 2001) (noting that while the historic
25.
trend disfavored removal, many courts have reassessed the issue). See also James, supra
note 10, at 61-62.
Baures, 770 A.2d at 217 (stating that courts throughout the United States "have
26.
not developed a uniform approach" to relocation cases).

See Steve Leban & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to Custodial Parent
27.
Move-Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 498 (1998). See also McGough, supra note 9,

at 303 (noting that there are four different approaches currently being utilized among
American jurisdictions).
28. See James, supra note 10, at 62. See also Leban & Moriarty, supra note 27, at
498.
29. James, supra note 10, at 62.
30. Leban & Moriarty, supra note 27, at 498. Illinois follows this approach. See
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609 (2002) (placing the burden of proof on the party seeking relocation).
Leban & Moriarty, supra note 27, at 498. See also James, supra note 10, at 62.
31.

Nora Lockwood Tooher, Legal Pendulum In Custody Relocation Cases Swings
32.
Toward 'What's Best For The Children,' LAW. WKLY. USA, July 19, 2004, at 15.
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the parties.3 3 While some commentators have suggested that state imposed
restrictions on the right of custodial parents to relocate violates fundamental constitutional rights,34 courts have generally avoided any analysis in this
area. The few state court decisions that have undertaken a constitutional
rights analysis have yielded less than definitive results.35 Thus, relocation
cases are uniformly decided on a case-by-case basis, with determinations
based on the best interests of the child. When viewed in the context of
overarching social policy, the question then becomes: are the best interests
of minor children promoted by allowing, or restricting the right of the custodial parent to move a child to a distant locale away from the noncustodial parent?
From a social science perspective, the leading proponent of the theory
that relocating with the custodial parent is in the best interests of the child
is Dr. Judith Wallerstein, a psychologist based in California.36 In various
articles and amicus curie briefs, Dr. Wallerstein has argued that courts
should be primarily concerned with protecting the relationship between the
child and the custodial parent. 37 She states that "when courts intervene in
ways that disrupt the child's relationship with the custodial parent, serious
psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the parent."' 38 Dr.
Wallerstein discounts the widely held belief that frequent contact with both

33.
See LaFrance, supra note 5, at 3 ("State appellate courts decide relocation cases
virtually without reference to [federal constitutional] jurisprudence."). See also Robert E.
Oliphant, Minnesota's Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is There a Need for Change, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 723, 752 (2001) (discussing the impact of relocation restrictions on the
constitutional right to travel).
34.
See generally LaFrance, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that the federal constitutional rights of the custodial parent should prevail over the interests of the non-custodial
parent).
35.
See In re Custody of D.M.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Mont. 1998) (standing for
the proposition that the constitutional right to interstate travel is qualified by the obligations
of custody, the states interest in protecting the best interests of children, and the competing
interests of the non-custodial parent). The Montana Supreme Court also held that the furtherance of the best interests of the children may constitute a compelling state interest sufficient to warrant reasonable interference with the right to interstate travel. But see Jaramillo
v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M. 1991) (holding that the state could not impose a burden on the relocating parent that impairs the right to travel).
36.
See Oliphant, supra note 33, at 749-50. See also Tooher, supra note 32, at 19.
37.
See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J.Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerationin the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAm.
L.Q. 305, 311 (1996) (stating that "the centrality of the well-functioning custodial parentchild relationship" is the primary factor in the child's post-divorce adjustment). This article
is a reprint of the amica curiae brief that the authors filed in the seminal California Supreme
Court case of In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
38.
Wallerstein, supra note 37, at 311.
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parents is in the best interests of children and contends that the child's postdivorce success is most closely linked with that of the custodial parent. 9 In
sum, Dr. Wallerstein advises that when a child is in the primary physical
custody of one4?arent, that parent should be able to relocate, absent unusual
circumstances.
However, the theories supporting liberal relocation have not been universally accepted by state legislatures or social scientists, as proponents of
restrictions on the right to relocate have vigorously disputed Dr. Wallerstein's conclusions. 41 Among the most notable critics has been Dallasbased psychologist Dr. Richard A. Warshak. Dr. Warshak asserts that the
bulk of social science studies support the proposition that it is in a child's
best interests to be in close proximity with both parents.42 Dr. Warshak
further states that Dr. Wallerstein "ignores the broad consensus of professional opinion... that children normally develop close attachments to both
parents, and that they do best when they have the opportunity to establish
and maintain such attachments. ' ' 3 Other critics have attacked Dr. Wallerstein's research as anecdotal and potentially susceptible to researcher
bias.44
The theories advanced by Dr. Wallerstein and Dr. Warshak often go
head-to-head when states courts and legislatures set relocation policy,45 and
given how frequently courts have been forced to consider the issue,
whether a state can be categorized as "pro-relocation" or "anti-relocation"
is subject to frequent change.46 In 2004 alone, Georgia and California
abandoned strong pro-relocation policies in favor of a best interest analysis, 47 while South Carolina abandoned its presumption against allowing

Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Tooher, supra note 32, at 17 (noting that new research, including a recent Uni41.
versity of Arizona study, is casting doubt on Wallerstein's theories).
Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children'sBest Interests in Relocation
42.
Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000) (Dr. Warshak wrote that "a critical
reading of over seventy-five studies in social science literature, including Dr. Wallerstein's
earlier reports, generally supports a policy of encouraging both parents to remain in close
proximity to their children.").
Id. at 85.
43.
Oliphant, supra note 33, at 752.
44.
Leslie Eaton, Divorced Parents Move, Custody Gets Trickier, CHICAGO DAILY
45.
L. BULL., August 12, 2004, at 2 (detailing that both Wallerstein and Warshak submitted
briefs in a recent relocation case before the California Supreme Court).
Id. at 2 (stating that "the highest courts in at least seven states" have addressed
46.
relocation in the last three years).
See Bodne v. Bodne, 605 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the
47.
presumption in favor of relocation is no longer applicable in Georgia); In re Marriage of
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relocation. 48 The California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriageof
Lamusga,49 is particularly noteworthy as the case represents a departure
from the policy set by the Court's 1996 decision in In Re Marriageof Burgess,50 which is widely considered the most influential pro-relocation decision by a state supreme court. 5' It is speculated that the Lamusga decision
may influence other state courts to adopt the best interests test.52 However,
adoption of a "pure best interests" test as a matter of state policy does not
diminish the relevance of Dr. Wallerstein's and Dr. Warshak's theories, it
merely shifts to individual family court judges the onus of determining
whether relocation or continued contact with both parents better serves the
child."
These differing approaches and theories underscore the lack of a national consensus with regard to relocation policy, as it is clear that disagreement exists among psychologists and other experts as to the impact of
a custodial parent's relocation on a child. 54 Thus, when courts and legislatures seek to set policy with respect to relocation, they do so without a conclusive body of evidence that indicates whether or not interstate relocation
is generally in the best interests of minor children and also without a uniformly accepted approach to the issue from their sister states.
III.

A.

THE HISTORY OF CUSTODY RELOCATION LAW IN ILLINOIS

EARLY CASES AND STATUTES

The issue of relocation was first addressed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1849, in the case of Miner v. Miner.55 In Miner, divorcing parents
Martin and Laura Miner each sought custody of their daughter, Charlotte.56
Lamusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
48. See Latimer v. Farmer, 602 S.E.2d 32 (S.C. 2004).
49.
88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
50. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
51. Tooher, supra note 32, at 15 (noting that "supreme courts in several other states
followed California's lead" in the wake of the Burgess decision).
52. Eaton, supra note 45, at 2 (stating that the Lamusga ruling "is expected to influence courts around the country.").
53. Id. (noting that in New York, a pure best interest state, relocation decisions are
"all over the map.").
54. Oliphant, supra note 33, at 752. See also James, supra note 10, at 54-58 (discussing differing social science theories on effects of relocation on minor children).
55.

56.

1849 WL 4253 (Ill. Dec. Term).

Id. at *1.
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Under Illinois law at this time, a father had the legal right to custody of his
children unless he had "forfeited, waived or lost it by misconduct, misfortune, or some peculiar circumstances. 51 In spite of this presumption, the
trial court awarded custody of Charlotte to Laura Miner.5 8 On appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's custody determination,
stating that the trial court record showed Martin Miner's conduct toward
his wife to be "unreasonable," "oppressive," and "cruel" to such an extent
that such behavior had caused her health to be seriously impaired. 59 After
holding that Laura was the proper custodian of Charlotte, the court turned
to the issue of relocation, noting that the record indicated that Laura
planned to move with Charlotte outside the state of Illinois. 6° Using
sweeping language, the court made clear that any attempt by Laura to remove Charlotte outside the borders of Illinois would result in a finding of
contempt:
[Removal of the child from the state] can not be tolerated
and must be guarded against. While the custody of the
child is given to the mother, the father must not be wholly
deprived of its society, but must be allowed to access it
upon all reasonable occasions. The child, although entrusted to the care of the mother, is nevertheless a ward of
the court, and any attempt on the part of either parent to
alienate its affections from the other would be a contempt
of the court, and would be visited by judgments as such.
Indeed this would be held to be an abuse of the child,
which the court would consider it a solemn duty to protect.6'
This language set forth what would be the controlling precedent and policy
in Illinois relocation law for the next century, as courts regularly denied
relocation based on the Miner court's reasoning that one parent could not
"alienate" the other parent from their child.6 2

57. Id. at *5
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id. at *6
60. Id. at *7.
61. Miner, 1849 WL 4253, at *7.
62. See Hewitt v. Long, 1875 WL 8220, at *7 (Ill.
Jan. Term) (citing Miner in prohibiting father from relocating daughter to Iowa); Chase v. Chase, 1896 WL 3144, at *2 (Ill.
App. 2d Dist. Dec. Term) (awarding custody to father and citing Miner for the proposition
that removal of children from the state is "against the policy of our law and ought not be
permitted."). See also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d 117, 121 (I11.
App. 2d Dist. 1952)
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By the mid-twentieth century, however, the increasing ease of mobility and the increasing prominence of the best interests of the child standard
in family court jurisprudence were causing a change in the political climate, and legal commentators in Illinois were becoming harshly critical of
the state's hard line policy against allowing relocation. In 1952, the case of
Schmidt v. Schmidt ushered in a new era in Illinois relocation law. 63 In
Schmidt, the custodial mother, Pearl Schmidt, sought to relocate with her
10-year-old son, Dale, from Highland Park, Illinois to New York. 64 At the
time of the petition for removal, Pearl Schmidt was considering marrying
Kendall Rowell, an engineer from New York with a large income. 65
Dale's father, Aage Schmidt, filed a counter petition asking for a change in
custody.66 After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that it would be
in the best interests of Dale Schmidt to remain in the care and custody of
his mother.67 The trial court further ruled that upon her remarriage, Pearl
Schmidt would be permitted to remove Dale with her to New York.6 8 The
court ordered that Dale would live with Aage Schmidt in Highland Park for
about seven weeks during the summer months and additional periods during the annual Christmas and spring vacation periods. 69 In addition, the
would be responsible for payment of
court ordered that Pearl Schmidt
70
travel expenses for these visits.
On appeal, Aage Schmidt contended that the trial court had no authority to allow Dale Schmidt to be removed from Illinois, citing Miner and its
progeny in support of this argument. 71 The appellate court rejected the
argument that Miner precluded the trial court from allowing removal.72
The court took note of the fact that the Miner case was over 100 years old,
and that since that time conditions and modes of transportation had "vastly
changed., 73 In light of these changes, the court stated that it would be
"harsh and absurd" to recognize a bright-line rule that a child could never
be taken out of the state.74
(detailing that most of the Illinois cases supporting the proposition that a child may not be
taken out of the state are based on Miner).
105 N.E.2d at 117.
63.
64.
Id. at 118.
65. Id.
66. Id.
Id. at 119.
67.
68. Id.
Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d at 119.
69.
70. Id.
Id.
71.
72.
Id. at 121.
73. Id.
74.
Id. The court stated that "modem ways of living require us to adopt the view
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Instead of following the Miner rule, the appellate court held that the
best interest of the child standard was the appropriate test for determining
whether relocation should be permitted.75 The court stated that it is "elementary that who should have the custody of a child must be determined by
considering the welfare of the child" 76 and further stated that the paramount
question in a custody determination is "not what the parents wish, not who
was wrong or who was right when the decree was entered dissolving the
marriage, not the punishment of the father or mother, but what is best for
the child at the time the custody is fixed.",77 Reviewing the record in light
of the best interests standard, the appellate court noted that the trial judge
was in a better position to decide the custody question and was correct in
determining that Dale Schmidt's interests were best served by being in the
custody of his mother and relocating with her to New York.78
Schmidt was the first Illinois case that allowed removal on the basis of
the best interests of the child standard. The best interests test set forth in
Schmidt quickly gained acceptance throughout the state, and the Illinois
General Assembly adopted the Schmidt court's best interests test when it
passed the state's first statutory provision governing the issue of removal.79
The provision stated that "the court may grant leave, before or after decree,
to any party having custody of the minor child or children to remove such
child or children from Illinois whenever such removal is in the best interests of such child or children. 80 The statute further provided that in cases
where removal is permitted, the court may require the removing
party to
81
give "reasonable security guaranteeing return" of the children.
While the enactment of the statute made clear that the best interests of
the child was the determinative factor in relocation cases, it provided no
guidance with respect to what circumstances needed to be in place for removal to be approved under this standard. In addition, the original statute
failed to state which party carried the burden of proof in showing that removal was in the best interests of the child. Thus, even with the statutory
provision in place, key elements of removal actions were left to case precedent. Circumstances which the courts considered relevant in making best

that where circumstances demand it for the best interests of the child, it should be permitted
that he be taken out of the State and the jurisdiction of the court." Id. at 122
75.
Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d at 121 (stating that "[i]n cases of this kind the matter of
first importance is the welfare of the child.").
76.
Id. at 119.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 122.
79. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 40, Para. 14 (1959) (amended 1977).
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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interests determinations included improved employment opportunities for
the parent seeking removal,8 2 improved health and welfare of the child,83
and improved educational opportunities for the child. 84 The mere desire to
move, without more, was generally considered insufficient to justify removal. 85 However, inconvenience to a non-custodial parent, standing alone,
was typically not a sufficient basis for denial of removal.86
In 1977, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which provided comprehensive statutory
guidelines for divorce and custody proceedings. 87 The removal statute was
designated as section 609 of the IMDMA. However, no substantive
changes were made to the statute.88 In the meantime, a split had developed
in the appellate courts with regard to which party had the burden of proof
in removal litigation. 89 The First District Court of Appeals held that removal should be allowed "unless a specific showing is made that removal
would be contrary to the best interests of the child." 90 However, the Fifth
District Court of Appeals went the opposite direction, holding that the party
seeking leave carried the burden of proof.9 The Illinois General Assembly
resolved the circuit split in 1981 by revising section 609, adding language
that "the burden of proving that such removal is in the best interests of the
child or children is on the party seeking
removal. 92 Section 609 has not
93
1981.
been substantially modified since

82.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (Marshall Auerbach and Albert E. Jenner Jr., Historical and Practice Notes).
83.
See Tandy v. Tandy 355 N.E.2d 585, 588 (IlL. App. 1st Dist. 1976).
84.
See Gray v. Gray, 372 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1978).
85.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (Marshall Auerbach and Albert E. Jenner Jr., Historical and Practice Notes); See also Quiren v. Quiren,
365 N.E.2d 226, 228 (ill. App. 5th Dist. 1977).
86.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (Marshall Auerbach and Albert E. Jenner Jr., Historical and Practice Notes); See also Gray, 372 N.E.2d at
913 ("the visitation difficulties of the non-custodial parent are not alone sufficient to deny a
petition for removal.").
87.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 40, § 101 (1979).
i. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (1979).
88.
89.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (Marshall Auerbach and Albert E. Jenner Jr., Historical and Practice Notes) (detailing the different rulings among Illinois appellate courts on the burden of proof issue).
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 40, Para. 609 (1983).
93.
See 750 hiL. COMP. STAT. § 5/609 (2003).
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BEST INTEREST GUIDELINES UNVEILED: IN RE MARRIAGE OF ECKERT

With the question as to which party carried the burden of proof answered, it remained to be seen what, if any, guidelines would emerge for
determining when removal was in the best interests of the child. These
guidelines finally emerged in 1988, when the Illinois Supreme Court decided the seminal case of In re Marriageof Eckert. In Eckert, the custodial
parent, Carol Eckert, petitioned the trial court for leave to remove her son
Matthew from Belleville, Illinois to Yuma, Arizona.94 Matthew's father,
Mark Eckert, opposed the petition for removal, alleging that Carol's interest in moving to Yuma was self-serving and contrary to Matthew's best
interests. 95 Mark further asserted that moving to Yuma would cause Matthew "grave psychological trauma" and "irrevocably
injure the close par96
ent-child relationship between father and son."
Carol's petition for removal was based on prospective enhancement to
her career and the potential for improvement to the health of Carol's son
97
from a previous marriage, Bernie Plassmayer, who suffered from asthma.
At the time of the removal hearing, Carol was teaching nursing at East St.
Louis State Community College, where she earned a salary of $21,350.98
Carol testified that she had been offered a teaching position at the Junior
College in Yuma, Arizona and that the pay scale for the position ranged
from $19,000 to $23,000. 99
With respect to Carol's assertion that the move to Arizona would help
her son Bernie's asthmatic condition, a physician testified that the climate
in Belleville, Illinois was unfavorable to asthmatics. 1°° Carol also presented evidence that the quality of life for her children in Yuma would be
at least equal to that offered in Belleville, based on the theory that their
housing, schools, and activities would be enhanced by the new climate. 10 1
Mark Eckert was employed as a funeral home attendant, ambulance
driver, and emergency medical technician.10 2 The record indicated that
despite an inconsistent work schedule, Mark had never missed a visitation
with Matthew. 0 3 Several witnesses testified that Mark was an "exceptional

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (Ill. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1043 (the testifying physician was Carol Eckert's father).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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parent" who was actively involved in his son's life. 104 Dr. Cuneo, the court
appointed psychologist who evaluated the parties and Matthew, described
Mark Eckert's relationship with Matthew as "excellent" and "one of the
best I've seen" and testified that Matthew's best interests would be served
by remaining in the Belleville area. 0 5 In addition, there was evidence that
Carol had attempted to interfere with Mark's visitation rights.10
The trial court denied Carol's petition for removal.' °7 In making its
ruling, the court reasoned that disregarding its effects on Matthew's relationship with his father, the move to Yuma would be "neutral. '0 8 When
the move was considered in light of the effect it would have on Matthew's
exceptional relationship with his father, "the child's best interests are
served by a continuation of the present situation."' 1 9
The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court's denial of the
petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 0 The appellate
court based this ruling primarily on the reasoning that (1) Carol had articulated a plausible reason for the move and (2) the only detriment Mdrk could
111
establish as a result of the move was a decrease in his visitation time.
The appellate court reasoned that "a petition for removal should be granted
'unless rather strong negative circumstances militate against it"' and further
stated that the "'dilution of rights of visitation2 of have not constituted such
negative factors that will prohibit removal."' 1
Mark appealed the reversal to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing that
the appellate court's decision rendered the best interests of the child analysis meaningless because it essentially allowed the custodial parent to remove the child from the state for any articulated reason.! 3 The Illinois
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and in making its decision, provided
its most thorough guidance to date on the issue of removal, setting forth a
series of factors to guide Illinois courts in deciding relocation cases.
The court began by restating the settled principles that removal actions
were to be determined based on the best interests of the child and that a

Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1043.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 1043-44.
110.
111.
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1044. The court also acknowledged that Matthew and
Bernie had developed a close relationship and that Carol was dating a physician in Yuma at
the time and there had been some talk of the two getting married.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
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best interest determination must be based on the specific circumstances of
each case. 1 4 The court then stated that despite the individualized nature of
removal cases, a series of factors could aid trial courts in best interest determinations."15 First, trial courts should consider whether the proposed
move is likely to improve the general quality of life for both the custodial
parent and the child. 16 In addition, trial courts should consider the motives
of the custodial parent in seeking the move and similarly, the motives of
the non-custodial parent in resisting the move. 1 7 The court then acknowledged that "it is also in the best interests of the child to have a healthy and
close relationship with both parents, as well as other family members" and
therefore the "visitation rights of the non-custodial parent should be carefully considered."' " 8 In considering these visitation rights, the trial court
indicated that "when removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially
impair the non-custodial parent's involvement with the child, the trial court
should examine the potential harm to the child which may result from the
move."'" 9 Thus, the court stated that another factor in removal cases is
"whether, in a given case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can
be reached if the move is allowed."' 120 The court described a reasonable
visitation schedule as "one that will preserve and foster the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent."' 21 Finally, the court stated that a trial
court's examination of removal petition should be guided by the policy of
the IMDMA in custody matters and noted that an underlying purpose of the
IMDMA is "to secure the maximum parental involvement and cooperation

114. Id. at 1045.
115. Id. The standards the Eckert court cited were based largely on the seminal New
Jersey relocation case of D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976), which the court referenced throughout its opinion. This was not the first time an
Illinois court turned to D'Onofrio for guidance in a relocation case, as the opinion had also
been cited favorably ten years earlier in Gallagher v. Gallagher,376 N.E.2d 279, 282-83
(1st Dist. 1978).
116.
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1046.
119.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.The court also noted in this context that a trial court should be reluctant to
interfere with a child's relationship with a non-custodial parent when the non-custodial
parent has "assiduously exercised his or her visitation rights." By contrast, the court stated
that when a non-custodial parent has not exercised his or her visitation rights that fact
should be considered as well. Seemingly, failure to exercise visitation rights would factor in
the Eckert test both by implying an improper motive for resisting the move and by reflecting
poorly on the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child that is sought to be
preserved by denying removal.
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of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral, and emotional wellbeing of the children during and after the litigation.' ' 2
In applying these principles, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
appellate court had erred in reversing the trial court and affirmed the trial
court's denial of Carol's petition for removal. 23 The court reasoned that
although Carol testified that she desired the move to better her career and
financial well-being, the new position in Yuma would pay little, if any,
more than the position she held in Belleville. 24 Further, the court rejected
Carol's contention that the move would improve Bernie's asthmatic condition, noting the trial court's finding that there was no evidence introduced
on how the move would affect Bernie's asthma.125 As a final matter, the
court reminded that "a trial court's determination of what is in the best interests of the child should not be reversed unless it is clearly against the
manifest weight of the evidence and it appears a manifest injustice has occurred." 126 The court concluded that the record supported the trial court's27
finding that removal to Arizona would not be in Matthew's best interests.
C.

POST-ECKERT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ILLINOIS DISTRICT COURTS

Eckert provided Illinois courts with five clear factors for consideration
in determining whether a proposed removal is in the best interests of a minor child.1 28 The five factors are: (1) whether the out-of-state move is
likely to improve the quality of life of the child and the custodial parent, (2)
the reasons behind the custodial parent's desire to move, (3) the reasons of
the non-custodial parent in contesting the move, (4) the effect the move
will have on the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent, and (5)
whether the parties or the court can craft a visitation schedule that is "realistic and reasonable" if the move is allowed. 29 These factors were confirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1996 in the case of In re Marriage
of Smith,130 which added the caveats that the Eckert factors were "not ex-

122.
Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
123.
Id. at 1045.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 1047.
127.
Id.
128.
Gilmore & Gitlin, supra note 17, at 76; See also Michael P. McElroy, et al.,
Removal of Child From Illinois, 7 NICHOLS ILL. CIV. PRAC. § 139.132 (May 2003) (expressing standard of removal as a five factor test based on Eckert guidelines).
129.
McElroy, supra note 128, at 76.
130.
665 N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. 1996) (applying Eckert factors in affirming trial court's
denial of removal).
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clusive" and "the weight to be given each factor will vary according to the
31
facts of each case."'
Though the primary factors governing removal have remained intact
in the fifteen years that have passed since the Eckert decision, Illinois
courts have addressed some significant issues pertaining to relocation law
with respect to the effect of joint custody orders and private agreements
limiting removal and the proper application of the Eckert factors. The former is illustrated by the 1992 case of In re Marriage of Yndestad. 132 In
Yndestad, Richard and Anita Yndestad had entered into a joint parenting
agreement upon their divorce, which was incorporated into the judgment of
dissolution.' 33 Under this agreement, Richard and Anita had joint legal
34
custody of their daughter Kerry, with primary physical custody to Anita.
The agreement allowed Richard liberal visitation time and further provided
135
that Anita and Kerry would live within fifty miles of Naperville, Illinois.
The agreement contained an additional provision stating that if Richard
moved out of the same fifty-mile area, then Anita would no longer be
bound by the restriction.' 36 Anita acknowledged that the parties' agreement
as to where they would reside was a substantial factor in their agreement on
the disposition of custody. 37 However, less than six months after the
judgment of dissolution was entered, Anita filed a petition to remove Kerry
to Wisconsin.' 38 Richard moved to strike the petition to remove, contending that Anita was seeking to modify the custody judgment and had failed
to include affidavits showing possible serious endangerment as required by
section 610 of the IMDMA. 139 The trial court agreed and granted Richard's
motion to dismiss.

131.
Id. at 1213. In spite of the fact that the Smith court stated that the Eckert factors
are "not exclusive," the court seemed to analyze the case within the framework of the Eckert
factors.
132.
597 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist. 1992).
133.
id. at 216.
134.
Id. at 217.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. Provisions like this one would seem to mitigate, if not eliminate, the argument that laws disfavoring removal unfairly bind only one party (the custodial parent) while
providing no limitation on the other (the non-custodial parent).
137.
Id.
138.
Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 217.
139.
Id. Section 610 of the IMDMA provides that:
[N]o motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2
years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment
may seriously endanger his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/610(a) (2003). This provides a heightened standard for modification
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In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of Anita's petition to remove,
the Court of Appeals for the Second District addressed a number of key
issues in removal law. First, the court ruled that a petition to remove is not
a petition for modification of a custody judgment as defined by section 610
of the IMDMA. 140 Thus, there was no need for Anita to present affidavits
showing serious endangerment, because the relevant IMDMA provision in
a removal action is section 609, not section 610.141 Second, the court ruled
that private agreements between the divorcing parties, even when incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, do not prevent a court from allowing
removal when such removal is in the best interests of the child.1 42 The
court based this decision on a review of section 609 and specifically cited
the statute's language that the court may grant leave to remove a child from
1 43
Illinois "'whenever such approval is in the best interests of the child.'
The court found no language in the other sections of the IMDMA indicating that trial judges were restricted by private agreements. 144 The court
concluded by remanding the case back to the trial court for a determination
as to whether the removal would be in the best interests of the child based
on the factors set forth in Eckert.145 Although the appellate court never
reached a determination of whether Kerry would be removed to Wisconsin,
it was clear that the existence of joint custody rights, a recent custody judgment, and a private agreement between the parties limiting the right of removal were not sufficient to prohibit courts from granting removal.
A second significant development in the Illinois courts has been the
manner in which the five Eckert factors have been applied. While Illinois
courts have consistently and uniformly acknowledged these five factors as
the guiding principles in removal cases, the courts' application of these
factors has been anything but uniform. A 1996 article in the Illinois Bar
Journal examined the way the five Illinois appellate districts treated removal cases under the Eckert guidelines from 1990 to 1995 and found wide
discrepancies. 146 Specifically, the article found that the first, fourth, and
fifth appellate districts were allowing removal upon a showing of economic
necessity on the part of the petitioner, although these courts never formally

in the first two years, as custody modifications after that period require only a showing of a
substantial change in material circumstances. See 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/610(a) (2003).
Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 218.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 219.
142.
Id. (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/609 (2003)).
143.
See id.
144.
Id. at 220.
145.
Gilmore & Gitlin, supra note 17, at 76 (stating that appellate districts were
146.
"divergent" in the application of the Eckert factors).
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acknowledged applying such a test. 147 By contrast, the third appellate district almost always allowed removal, while the second appellate district
almost always denied removal. 48 A more recent review of Illinois cases
has shown that this trend has, at least to some degree, continued. The second district has been the most reluctant to grant removal, while the other
districts, to varying degrees,
have been more receptive to removal petitions
49
by custodial parents.
The primary tangible difference in the courts' treatment of relocation
issues has derived from different applications of the Eckert test with respect
to the evaluation of the prospective benefits the proposed move would have
on the life of the child and the parent. 150 Courts that liberally allow relocation tend to give more weight to "indirect benefits," or benefits that the
custodial parent realizes from the move that by extension enhance the quality of life for the children.1 5 1 Courts that are more reluctant to allow relocation have tended to require a showing that a move will bring more precise
benefits to the life of the child. 152 This difference in analysis set the stage
for In re Marriageof Collingbourne, in which the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the issue of removal for the first time in seven years.
D.

INDIRECT BENEFITS: IN RE MARRIAGE OF COLLINGBOURNE

In September of 1999, Geoff and Soryia Collingbourne divorced after
fourteen years of marriage.1 53 The parties had two children from the marriage, Tyler and Geoffrey.1 54 The divorce decree incorporated a marital
settlement agreement, which provided that the parties would have joint

147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Child Custody: Easing the Way for Out-of-State
Removal, 91 ILL. B.J. 326, 327 (2003). This article quoted family law attorney Steven
Peskind as saying that prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in In re Marriage of
Collingbourne he might have counseled a client to move within Illinois, perhaps to a locale
in the third district, before requesting leave to remove a child to another state.
150.
Gilmore & Gitlin, supra note 17, at 80 (noting the second district did not acknowledge any indirect benefits as a basis for removal, thus negating the need for the type
of "economic necessity" inquiry that the other districts were engaging in at the time).
151.
See In re Marriage of Miroballi, 589 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1992) (allowing removal based on benefits that child will gain from mother's ability to leave
workforce).
152.
See In re Marriage of Berk, 574 N.E.2d 1364, 1368 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd Dist.
1991) (stating that "the increase in the custodial parent's life is only important insofar as it
increases the children's quality of life and furthers the children's best interests.").
153.
In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d 532, 533 (Ill. 2003).
154.
Id.
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legal custody of their children, with a split physical custody arrangement
where Soryia had sole physical custody of Tyler (who was eight years old
at the time of the divorce) and Geoff had sole physical custody of Geoffrey
(who was thirteen years old at the time of the divorce). 155 The marital settlement agreement also incorporated a joint parenting agreement, which set
forth, inter alia, the visitation schedule between the parents and the children.'5 6 The visitation schedule provided for each parent to have both children every other weekend and on alternating holidays. 57 The agreement
5
also allowed for additional visitation, as authorized by the parties.
In June of 2001, Soryia filed a petition to remove Tyler (who was then
ten years of age) from Illinois to Massachusetts, citing improved economic,
residential, and educational opportunities as reasons why the move would
be in Tyler's best interests.1 59 Geoffrey opposed the move, stating in his
answer that the proposed move would improve only the quality of Soryia's
life and that Tyler's quality of life would be negatively affected by the
move, as it would "remove him from his father, brother,16extended
family,
0
friends, and the community in which he had been raised."'
The circuit court held a hearing on Soryia's petition in August of
2001.6l Soryia testified that she had become engaged to Mark Rothman,
who resided in Sharon, Massachusetts.1 62 Mark owned and operated his
own business in Sharon, the duties of which precluded him from relocating
from Massachusetts. 63 Soryia testified that Mark had offered her employment at his firm upon moving to Massachusetts in a position similar to her
current job at a base salary of $75,000 with incentives that could raise her
income as high as $100,000.164 Soryia testified that she was earning
$50,000 per year in her current position, and that the company where she
was employed was experiencing financial difficulties. 65 Soryia further

155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Collingboume, 791 N.E.2d at 534.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 537.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 537. Soryia also claimed that her job with PetAg,
Inc. was "in jeopardy due to the company's severe financial difficulties." In support of this
assertion, she testified that some PetAg, Inc. employees (though apparently not Soryia herself) had taken pay cuts and that company bonuses had been terminated. On crossexamination, Soryia testified that she had placed her resume on an Internet web site in an
effort to find a new position in Illinois, but admitted that she had done nothing else to af-
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alleged that the move to Massachusetts would allow her a work schedule
which would enable her to be home with Tyler before and after school,
schedule necessitated Tyler spending three hours per
whereas her current
66
care.'
day
in
day
In addition, Soryia stated that upon moving to Massachusetts, Tyler
would live in a three-bedroom, 3,000 square foot home. 167 At the time of68
the petition, she and Tyler were living in a two-bedroom apartment.
Soryia further asserted that Tyler's prospective new school district in Massachusetts was significantly better than the district where Tyler was currently enrolled. 169 Finally, Soryia alleged that Geoff had missed significant
visitation time due to work commitments 170 and that Tyler's relationship
one, as the two "did not spend a subwith his older brother was not a close
7
stantial amount of time together."' '
Soryia also proposed a visitation schedule that would purportedly provide Geoff with more visitation time than he had under the current agreement, by allowing for extended periods of visitation during the summer
months and vacation periods when school was not in session. 7 2 This proChicago that
posed schedule entailed Tyler taking flights from Boston to 173
would encompass from three to five hours of travel each way.
After Soryia's testimony, Mark Rothman testified on her behalf, stating that his business precluded him from leaving the New England area and
that he had offered Soryia employment at $75,000 per year plus incentives. 74 He also testified that Soryia's job would be such that she could
structure her own work schedule. 75 In addition, Mark testified that he
76
would promote the continuing relationship between Tyler and his father. 1
firmatively seek employment in the area. Id. at 535.
166.
Id. at 537. Soryia's petition alleged that a typical school day schedule for Tyler
included one hour at day care before school and two hours after school. The petition alleged
that when school was not in session Tyler would spend nine hours per weekday in daycare.
Soryia claimed that this arrangement made it difficult for Tyler to participate in extracurricular activities. Id. at 534.
167.
Id. at 534.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id. Soryia testified that Geoff had missed portions of fifteen to twenty Saturdays in 2000.
Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d. at 535.
171.
172.
Id. at 537.
173.
Id. Soryia testified at the removal hearing that she would accompany Tyler on
the trips until he was old enough to travel by himself. She also testified that she would pay
the travel expenses. Id.
174.
Id. at 538.
175.
Id.
176.
Id. at 539.
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Finally, Soryia called Tyler's fourth grade teacher to the witness stand, who
testified that Tyler was an "'above average student,"' a 'hard worker,"'
'very well behaved,"' and a 'great kid."' 177 No other witnesses testified
178
on Soryia's behalf.
Geoff Collingbourne testified that he lived in a three-bedroom home
in Hampshire, Illinois, with Geoffrey (his aforementioned son from his
marriage to Soryia), his new wife Carol, and her six-year-old son,
Tommy. 179 Geoff said that he was employed as an electrician and that he
earned about $70,000 per year.1 80 Geoff stated that he had "never missed a
weekend visitation with Tyler."1 81 Geoff also testified as to Tyler's relationship with his extended family, saying that Tyler visited them about
once a month and also on holidays and family events.1 82 He stated that,
contrary to Soryia's assertions, Tyler and his brother
had "'a very good
83
relationship"' and that they often did things together.'
Also testifying on Geoff s behalf was Gary Wright, the principal of
Hampshire Elementary School. 184 Gary testified that Tyler was performing
up to state standards in all academic
areas,1 85 and did not have any discipli186
problems.
behavioral
nary or
In addition to hearing the testimony of the witnesses for the parties,
the trial court conducted an in camera interview with Tyler Collingbourne.18 7 Tyler told the court he had traveled with Soryia to Massachusetts on about four different occasions.1 88 While he thought Massachusetts
was "'okay,"' Tyler indicated to the court that he feared leaving his father,
family, and friends.1 89 Tyler also stated that he190 had previously told Soryia
that he did not want to move to Massachusetts.

177.
Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 539. The teacher also testified that Soryia was an
active parent who she regularly interacted with regarding Tyler's schooling.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. Geoff did acknowledge that he, on some occasions, had to work overtime
Saturdays when Tyler was scheduled to visit and during this time the brothers were either
home together or with Soryia.
182.
Id.
183.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 539.
.184.
Id. at 5.40.
185.
Id. This conclusion was based on standardized testing conducted at the school
when Tyler was in the third grade.
186.
Id.
187.
Id. at 541.
188.
Id.
189.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 541.
190.
Id.
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The trial court granted Soryia's petition to remove Tyler from Illinois

to Massachusetts. 1 9' The court stated its ruling was guided by section 609
of the IMDMA and the factors set forth in Eckert. 192 In applying the Eckert
standards, the trial court found that "neither Soryia nor Geoff had an improper motive in requesting or objecting to Tyler's removal."' 93 Furthermore, the trial court found that the benefits of Soryia obtaining a job with a
greater salary and more scheduling flexibility outweighed the initial disruption the move would cause in Tyler's life.194 As per Eckert, the visitation
rights of Geoff were also considered and the trial court determined that "a
realistic and reasonable visitation schedule could be reached if the move
were allowed." 195 The court found the alternative visitation schedule proposed by Soryia to be "comparable" to the current arrangement in the number of days when Tyler would be with Geoff.196 The trial court stated that
it had "tried to make a reasoned assessment as to the best interests of the
child"'197 and the "'weight of the evidence favors removal in this case."' 198
Shortly after the circuit court ruling, Geoff filed a notice of appeal to
the Second District Court of Appeals. In July 2002, the appellate court
reversed. 199 The appellate court based its reasoning on the trial court's finding that the evidence did not establish that Tyler would experience a substantial direct benefit from the move to Massachusetts. 200 The appellate
majority held that 'it is insufficient to focus only on the improvement in
the custodial parent's life. Rather, the improvement in a custodial parent's
quality of life is only important insofar as it increases and furthers the
child's quality of life."' 20 1 The appellate majority also held that the visitation proposed by Soryia was "not in Tyler's best interest., 20 2 Based on

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 542.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

201.
Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 542 (quoting In re Marriage of Collingboume,
774 N.E.2d 448, 454 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2002)). The appellate majority further noted that
"an increased standard of living will occur in almost every case of remarriage" and "cannot
alone be determinative." Id.
202.
Id. at 543. The appellate majority acknowledged that the proposed visitation
schedule was comparable to the schedule currently in use, but the majority expressed reservations about the proposed schedule because it would require Tyler to be away from his
Massachusetts home during every school break.
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these factors, the appellate majority held that the evidence from the hearing, when viewed in the context of the Eckert factors, indicated that removing Tyler to Massachusetts was not in his best interests.2 °3
The Illinois Supreme Court granted Soryia leave to appeal. In briefs
to the court, Soryia contended she had met her burden of proving the move
was in Tyler's best interest and that the appellate court had erred in requiring her to prove that he would reap a direct benefit from the move.
Geoff responded by contending that the appellate court had properly reversed the trial court's ruling and asked the court to set forth a rule that
custodial parents seeking to remove children from Illinois must show that
such children will directly benefit from the move.20 5 In a ruling handed
down in May, 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
and reinstated the circuit court's decision to grant Soryia's petition for removal.2 °6 In reaching this holding, the court reaffirmed the standards set
forth in Eckert as the controlling law in Illinois removal cases. 22007 Further,
the court stated that the Eckert factors 'are not exclusive,"' and a circuit
court "may consider other relevant factors, as dictated by the specific circumstances of each case, in arriving at a best interests determination. 2 8 In
addition, the court held that a trial court's best interests determination
"'should not be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of
the evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has occurred."' 20 9
Against this backdrop, the court proceeded through a step-by-step application of the Eckert test to the findings of the circuit court, with particular emphasis on evaluating the benefits of the move for both the custodial
parent and the child. According to the court, distinguishing between direct
and indirect benefits to a child is "not particularly helpful" to courts in
making a best interest determination. 210 The court also stated that 'if only
the direct benefits that affected children were considered, rarely would a
situation arise where removal would be permitted where children were in21a
good environment with good schools, good parents, and good friends."'
Furthermore, the court recognized "a palpable nexus between the custodial

203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 544.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
See Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 544-52.
208.
Id. at 545-46 (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (111.
1996).
209.
Id. at 545 (quoting Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046).
210.
Id. at 547.
211.
Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 727 N.E.2d 419, 423 (II1. App. Ct.
4th Dist. 2000).
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parent's quality of life and the child's quality of life, ' 212 and acknowledged
that the "best interests of the child cannot be fully understood without also
considering the best interests of the custodial parent. 21 3 Applying these
principles to the facts, the court found that the trial court had properly considered the indirect benefits the move to Massachusetts would provide to
Tyler Collingbourne and no showing of direct benefits was necessary to
support the trial court's decision to allow removal.2 14 The court observed
that permitting the move to Massachusetts would allow Soryia to marry
Mark and thus create "a new family unit," which presumably would be
beneficial to Tyler.21 5 The court also noted that the move would allow
Soryia to increase her income and provide flexibility in her work schedule,
which would presumably enhance Tyler's standard of living.2 16 The court
found these
indirect benefits sufficient to satisfy the benefits prong of
217
Eckert.
In addition to the benefits analysis, the court also examined the other
Eckert factors and affirmed the trial court's conclusions that neither party
had an improper motive for seeking or opposing removal. The court also
found that the alternative visitation schedule proposed by Soryia was a reasonable and realistic alternative to the current visitation schedule.21 8 Based
on these conclusions, the court found that the trial court's determination
that removal was in the best interests of Tyler Collingbourne was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.21 9
IV. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY GUIDELINES IN REMOVAL CASES

A 1997 article in the Hofstra Law Review stated that Illinois courts interpreted Eckert in such an inconsistent and unpredictable manner that Illinois parents were in a worse position than they would be in if there were no

212.
Id. at 548.
213.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 548.
214.
Id.
215.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
216.
217.
Id.
218.
Id. The court cautioned that a proposed visitation schedule that provides a noncustodial parent with the same number of visitation days as a prior arrangement "does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the quality of visitation between the child and the
non-custodial parent will also be the same." The court emphasized that a circuit court must
evaluate both the quality and quantity of visitation in making its best interest determination.
Id. at 551.
219.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 550.
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relocation standards at all. 220 While Collingbourne's determination of the
indirect benefits issue may alleviate some confusion, it remains difficult to
make sweeping generalizations or predictions as to under what circumstances a custodial parent will be granted leave to relocate with a minor
child outside of Illinois. Even though the Collingbourne court approved
the custodial parent's petition for removal, it must be remembered that the
ruling affirmed the finding of the trial court and thus could be more reflective of the great deference afforded trial courts in best interest determinations than of any shift in state policy with regard to relocation.221 Further,
the Collingbourne opinion expressly reiterated the principle that "the mere
desire to move, without more, is insufficient to warrant removal. 222 However, given the Collingbournecourt's willingness to allow removal even in
the total absence of any direct benefit to the child, it can hardly be said that
the required best interests showing mandated by section 609 stands as an
insurmountable, or even overly formidable, hurdle for a custodial parent
who seeks to relocate out of state. The suggestion that uncertainty exists
even in the face of the Collingbourne decision is illustrated by the five relocation cases that have reached the appellate courts since the opinion was
issued. In those cases, relocation was denied in three instances and allowed
in two others.22 3
When viewing Illinois relocation law in light of Collingbourneand its
progeny, it can be concluded, at a bare minimum, that the Eckert test is still
the controlling law in Illinois for trial courts making best interest determinations in relocation cases.224 Thus, trial courts must consider the likeli-

220.
Ann M. Driscoll, In Search of a Standard:Resolving the Relocation Problem in
New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 175, 198 (1997) (describing Illinois case law as "a good
example of what not to do" in deciding removal cases).
221.
See Collingbourne, 791 N.E.2d at 545 (expounding on the broad deference
given to the trial court's best interest determinations).
222.
Id. at 549 (reiterating the Eckert holding that "the mere desire to move, without
more, is an insufficient basis for removal.").
223.
See In re Marriage of Stahl, 810 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004); In re
Marriage of Repond 812 N.E.2d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004); In re Marriage of Johnson,
815 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004); In re Marriage of Parr 802 N.E.2d 393 (Ill.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003); In re Marriage of Sale, 808 N.E.2d 1125 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
2004). The second district cases of Stahl, Repond, and Johnson are particularly noteworthy.
In Stahl, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying the custodial parent's proposed
move to Wisconsin. 810 N.E.2d at 607. In Repond, a panel of three different second district
judges approved a custodial parent's relocation to Switzerland, reversing the decision of the
trial court. 812 N.E.2d at 89. In Johnson, the court unanimously affirmed the trial court's
denial of a custodial parent's move to Arizona, and in doing so reiterated that "a child's best
interest cannot be'determined on a basis of any bright line rule." 815 N.E.2d at 1291.
224.
See Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 545 (applying the Eckert standards).
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hood that the proposed move will enhance the general quality of life for
both the custodial parent and the child, the motives of the parties, the effect
the proposed move would have on the visitation rights of the non-custodial
parent, and whether a realistic and reasonable visitation plan can be
reached if the move is allowed.22 5 It can also be concluded that a trial
court's ruling as to the best interests of the child will be given great deference on appeal, as lower court rulings are reviewed based on the manifest
weight of the evidence standard and should only be overturned when "it
appears that injustice has occurred. 22 6 In addition, a petition to relocate
will not be treated as a material change in circumstances so as to trigger a
reevaluation of custody.227 Finally, the fact that parents have joint custody
of their children will not give rise to different relocation standards or procedures, 228 and Illinois courts are not bound by settlement agreements that
restrict or limit the custodial parent's right to relocate.229
While these general rules afford Illinois trial courts great flexibility
and deference in deciding removal cases, an examination of these rules in
light of the underlying policies of the IMDMA, which should be the guiding force in removal actions, reveals incongruity with regard to both the
mechanics of best interests determinations and the goal of facilitating amicable settlements between divorcing parents.23 ° While the Illinois Supreme
Court has stated that the Eckert factors are not exclusive,231 the factors represent the only formal guidelines that courts must employ in relocation
cases and are clearly the guiding force in relocation decisions on both the
trial court and appellate court levels. Unfortunately, reliance on the Eckert
factors may lead to an incomplete analysis that fails to adequately consider
several areas that are relevant to determining whether a move is in the best
interests of the child. In addition, the silence of section 609 with respect to
relocation in the joint custody context or where a marital settlement agreement limits the right to relocation has led to a body of law that is inconsistent with the overarching policies of the IMDMA with regard to facilitating
the amicable settlement of disputes. This section illustrates the ramifications of a silent removal statute and suggests amendments to section 609

225.
Id. See also Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1044; 29 ILL. LAW & PRAC. PARENT AND
§ 26 (West 2003).
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 545.
226.
227.
See In re Marriage of Carlson, 576 N.E.2d 578, 579 (1991). See also Yndestad,
579 N.E.2d at 219.
228.
Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 219. See also Carlson, 576 N.E.2d at 579; In re Marriage of Creedon, 615 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Il1.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993).
229.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(b) (2002).
230.
Collingbourne,791 N.E.2d at 552.
231.
Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213.
CHILD
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that would facilitate more thorough best interests determinations and improve the possibility for the amicable settlement of custody disputes.
THE UNFORTUNATE RAMIFICATIONS OF A SILENT RELOCATION
A.
STATUTE

The failure of the Illinois General Assembly to incorporate specific

statutory guidelines for removal actions has led to an inconsistent body of
case law that is neither conducive to a thorough best interests of the child
analysis nor congruent with the policies of the IMDMA. A trial court's
examination of a removal petition should be guided by the policy of the
IMDMA.232 In initial custody determinations, section 602 of the IMDMA
provides that "the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interests of the child. 233 In making its determination, "the court shall consider all relevant factors. 2 34 The statute then enumerates eight specific
factors for consideration, including, inter alia, "the wishes of the child as to
his custodian, ' 235 "the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community," 236 "the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest," 237 and "the willingness and ability of each parent to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the
other parent and the child. 238 Section 602 further states, "the court shall
presume that the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents
and emotional well-being of their
regarding the physical, mental, moral, 239
child is in the best interest of the child.,

In contrast to the extensive best interests guidelines set forth in section
602 for general custody determinations, section 609 does not set forth any
specific factors to guide a court's best interests determination, and the best
interests factors outlined in the Eckert test do not expressly provide for
consideration of any of the issues set forth in section 602. Though Eckert
the reand its progeny do state that the Eckert factors are not exclusive,
sults in a number of cases seem to be based solely on the court's applica-

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

239.
240.

Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1046.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2002).
Id.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(2) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(4) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(3) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(a)(8) (2002).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(c) (2002).
Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213.
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tion of the enumerated Eckert factors, as opposed to other areas of consideration such as the child's adjustment to his school, the child's relationship
with extended family, or the wishes of the child.24'
Illustrative of the tendency to rigidly apply Eckert at the expense of a
more extensive best interests inquiry is the case of In re Marriageof Shaddle.242 In Shaddle, James and Kristine Shaddle shared joint legal custody of
their daughter, Devon, with primary physical custody belonging to
Kristine.24 3 In 1997, Kristine married Sidney Schiff, who resided in Florida, and sought to relocate with Devon to that state. 244 Her petition was
denied and Kristine continued to live with Devon in Illinois, with Sidney
residing in Florida.245 In 1999, Kristine moved to Florida and left Devon in
the care of James. 246 In the meantime, she filed a second petition for removal. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Kristine's second removal petition. 247 Though the trial court found that Kristine was "an excellent mother," the court expressed dismay at her tactic of moving to Florida
prior to the resolution of the removal action, finding that such a move evidenced that Kristine was not acting in Devon's best interest.248 The court
also found that Devon's relationship with her father was "exceptional," and
that Devon also enjoyed very close relationships with her grandmother and
her aunt, who resided in Illinois. 249 Most interestingly, the court acknowledged a series of allegations that were made in a prior divorce action
against Sidney Schiff.25 0 In the prior divorce action, Sidney agreed to a
court order that he have "no contact with his child . . . " as the record

"strongly suggested that [Sidney] had totally alienated his son by, among
other things, physically beating him.",25 ' The record also indicated that
Sidney had verbally abused his son, and that Sidney "thought he could heal
people with his hands" and "talked about spirits" he believed were living in
the family home.25 2

241.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 727 N.E.2d 419, 426 (Il. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 2000) (reversing the trial court's denial of removal based on Eckert factors, in spite of
the expressed wishes of the child and conflicting expert testimony as to whether the move
was in the best interests of the child).
242.
In re Marriage of Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d 525, 527 (fI. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000).
243.
Id.

244.
245.

Id.
Id.

247.

Id.

246.
248.

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. During this period, Kristine gave birth to a son, Michael.
Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 527.

Id. at 528.
Id.
Id. at 531, 534 (Steigmann J., dissenting).
Id. at 531.
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By a two to one margin, the Fourth District Court of Apeals reversed
'
the trial court and granted Kristine's petition for removal. 21 Writing for
the majority, Justice Cook admonished the trial court for comments made
regarding Kristine's decision to leave the state prior to receiving leave to
remove Devon, stating "an ex-wife who chooses to remarry and leave the
state cannot be criticized for that decision. 25 4 Justice Cook further stated
that the "importance of stability in custody judgments is recognized by the
law," and that it was "illogical to protect a father's visitation rights by tak255 Shifting to an
ing primary physical custody away from the mother.,
application of the Eckert factors, the court found that the move to Florida
offered both direct and indirect benefits to Devon, in that she would be
2 56
The court also found
with Kristine as part of a new, "traditional family.
that neither party had illegitimate reasons for seeking or opposing the
move. 257 The majority held that the visitation elements of the Eckert test
were satisfied because it would not be any more difficult for Devon to visit
258
James from Florida than it would for her to visit Kristine from Illinois.
259 JusNoting that there was no evidence that Sidney might harm Devon,
tice Cook wrote that the allegations against Sidney Schiff should carry "lit16
tle weight," and thus were not a sufficient basis to deny removal.
In a spirited dissent, Justice Steigmann criticized the appellate majority for having inappropriately dismissed the allegations against Sidney
Schiff.2 61 Justice Steigmann pointed out that upon Devon's removal to
Florida, Sidney would essentially be one of her parents and his impact on
her life would be "immeasurable., 262 Based on this impact, Justice Steigmann wrote that it was illogical not to consider Sidney's record as a parent

Id. at 527.
253.
Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 530.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Id.
257.
Id. This analysis fails to account for the fact that the only reason that visitation
258.
would be equally difficult is because Kristine had taken the step of relocating to Florida
without Devon, even after the 1997 petition for removal had been denied. Had Kristine
remained in Illinois pending the litigation the inquiry under the Eckert test would not have
been a circular comparison between the length of travel between two locales, but rather an
inquiry into whether Devon's relationship with her father could be preserved if the move
were allowed.
Id. at 531. The appellate majority's reliance on this point is somewhat curious
259.
considering that Devon had not lived with Sidney, but instead resided with James Shaddle in
Illinois while the litigation was pending.
Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 531.
260.
Id. at 533 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
261.
Id.
262.
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in an analysis of her best interests. 263 According to Justice Steigmann, the
proper inquiry for a reviewing court was whether a reasonable person could
conclude that it was in Devon's best interests not to move to Florida where
she would live with both Kristine and Sidney, and under this inquiry Sidney's parenting
record alone was "fully sufficient to justify the trial court's
'' 6
decision.

Shaddle serves as an example of the devastating results that can occur
when custody-related cases are not decided under adequately enumerated
best interests standards. As an initial matter, the case proved troublesome
partly because the most troubling areas for the court with regard to
Kristine's removal request (i.e. the tactic of moving to Florida as the litigation was pending and Sidney's bizarre and abusive parental history) did not
fit neatly into the Eckert factors for consideration in removal cases. Neither issue was probative of the benefits available from the move to Florida,
the motives of the respective parties, or the visitation schedule of the noncustodial parent. Though the Eckert factors are not to be construed as exclusive
26it
is difficult to discern whether any other factor weighed in the
Shaddle majority's analysis.
However, it can hardly be said that the issues that troubled the trial
court were not relevant to a proper determination of Devon's best interests.
Under the IMDMA's general custody provisions, the trial court must consider the "mental and physical health of all individuals involved., 266 As
Justice Steigmann properly pointed out, when Kristine married Sidney she
insured that he would be intimately involved in Devon's upbringing and
thus seemingly subject to scrutiny in the context of a best interests analysis. 2 67 However, under the Shaddle majority's application of the best interests test Sidney's abysmal parenting history was given little, if any, weight.
In addition to failing to consider the risks that Sidney posed to Devon,
the Shaddle majority admonished the trial court for comments pertaining to
Kristine's move away tactic, stating that such a tactic could not be criticized
unless its purpose was to hinder the relationship between the child and the
non-custodial parent.268 However, the Shaddle majority failed to indicate
why Kristine's behavior could not properly be examined as part of the trial
court's best interest analysis. The fact that Kristine was willing to move to

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Smith, 665 N.E.2d at 1213 (stating that the Eckert factors are "nonexclusive.").
266.

267.
268.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(5) (2002).

See Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 533 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
Id. at 530.
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Florida without Devon as the litigation was pending and leave her with
James speaks not only to Kristine's judgment and capacity to act in the best
interests of Devon, but also to her confidence in James' ability to be an
effective parent. 269 Further, the move had a significant effect on Devon's
living conditions at the time of the litigation, as she had been in her father's
care in Illinois for a period of approximately three months at the time of the
hearing and approximately eighteen months at the time the appeal was decided.2 7° In admonishing the trial court's treatment of Kristine's premature
move, the Shaddle majority also seemed to disregard the practical effects of
the move in favor of a proforma application of the Eckert test, as the move
effectively placed James Shaddle in the position of being Kristine's de
facto residential parent for a substantial period of time while the case was
litigated.
The Shaddle majority made a point of noting "the interests of the cus'27
todian should not be subordinated to those of the noncustodian., ' What
this often stated proposition misses is that the court's mandate under section 609 is not to make a judgment on competing parental interests, but
27 2
Properly applied, this
rather to determine the best interests of the child.
a parent-centered
from
distinguished
as
analysis,
inquiry is a child-centered
273
factors, the
Eckert
stated
the
By rigidly confining its analysis to
one.
Shaddle majority protected the interests of the custodial parent at the expense of the child.
Though some courts and commentators contend that the issues of relocation and custody pose separate and distinct questions for a trial court
274
and should not necessarily employ the same analysis, the paramount con-

Presumably, Kristine would not have left Devon in the care of her ex-husband
269.
in this manner if she had doubts as to his ability to care for her.
Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 527 (noting that Kristine had moved to Florida in "early
270.
summer of 1999," and that her second petition for removal was held in August of 1999).
The appellate decision was issued on November 22, 2000. Id. at 525.
Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d at 531.
271.
See James, supra note 10, at 51 (stating that in relocation cases, the focus
272.
should be on the best interests of the child, as distinguished from the best interests of the
custodial parent).
See Janet Leach Richards, Children's Rights v. Parent's Rights: A Proposed
273.
Solution to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 254-55 (1999)
(stating that "[tihe proper role for the court and the legislature is much clearer if the focus is
placed on the child's best interests rather than the parent's rights."). See also Schmidt, 105
N.E.2d at 121 (noting that "[i]n cases of this kind the matter of first importance is the welfare of the child.").
The primary argument against employing general custody standards appears to
274.
be that doing so amounts to a re-litigation of custody and subverts public policy with regard
to the finality of judgments. Thus, some states, including Illinois, have refused to treat
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sideration in either scenario is the best interests of the child.2 75 Thus, it
seems elementary that some of the factors employed in the initial custody
determination are also highly probative on the issue of whether relocation
is in the best interests of the child.276 For instance, an evaluation of a
child's current adjustment to his home and school environment would seem
to be equally relevant to best interests determinations in both custody and
relocation settings.277 The same principle also applies to a child's interrelationships with significant others such as siblings or extended family. 278 It is

difficult to imagine any scenario in which these factors would not have a
significant bearing on whether an interstate move would be in the best interests of a child. In cases such as Shaddle, consideration of "the mental
and physical health of all individuals involved" would be appropriate as
well.279 Section 609 would allow for a more complete and effective best
interests analysis if some or all of these factors were added to the Eckert
factors as required areas of trial court consideration in removal cases.
Another area in which the silence of section 609 has damaging repercussions, and further, is not conducive to the underlying policies of the
IMDMA is in the treatment of joint custody/shared parenting arrangements
and private relocation agreements. 280 As was illustrated in Yndestad, a peti-

relocation as a substantial change in circumstances which may automatically trigger a new
best interests analysis based on the general'custody standards. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/610 (2003) (defining the standards for modification of a custody decree). See also Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 218 (declining to apply IMDMA section 610 to removal cases).
However, it seems curious to reason that a move across state lines which necessarily involves a complete uprooting in a child's life is not, in fact, a substantial change in circumstances. See McGough, supra note 9, at 300 (stating that the relocation of a child to a new
home some distance away from his/her current residence is "indisputably a substantial
change in circumstances."). See also James, supra note 10, at 71; Cheryl S. Karner, Relocation: What Ought to Be, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1997, at 12, 14 (arguing that the notion that
relocation is not a substantial change in circumstances is "absurd.").
275.
See James, supra note 10, at 51. See also Richards, supra note 273, at 254-55.
276.
Richards, supra note 273, at 267 (citing a list of relocation-specific best interest
factors that should be considered "in addition to the ordinary best interests factors considered in initial custody determinations.") (emphasis added).
277.
See McGough, supra note 9, at 302 (stating that all relocation disputes "inherently produce disruption of child's physical environment and personal relationships.").
278.
Id.
279.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602(5) (2002) (listing the "physical and mental
health of all individuals involved" as a factor which "shall be considered" in custody determinations).
280.
Illinois law distinguishes between joint legal custody and joint physical custody. Typically, one parent is designated to have "primary physical custody" of the child.
For purposes of this comment, the term "joint custody/shared parenting arrangement" refers
to a scenario where the joint custody agreement that is approved by the court at the time of
dissolution contemplates the parties sharing the actual physical custody of the child to a
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tion for relocation does not give rise to a custody modification hearing under section 610, and neither a joint custody/shared parenting arrangement
nor or a settlement agreement limiting the right of relocation is binding on
the court. 28 1 Thus, it appears that parents who have joint custody of their
children or whose settlement agreements purport to limit the right of the
custodial parent to relocate with their child enjoy little, if any, additional
protection under Illinois law than that which is enjoyed by a non-custodial
parent in a sole custody arrangement. 282 The failure to provide significant
protection to parties with joint custody/shared parenting arrangements
and/or private agreements is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of
the IMDMA.
Section 102 of the IMDMA sets forth the Act's eight underlying purposes.283 Three of these purposes are particularly relevant to the issue of
relocation litigation. First, section 102 provides that one of the purposes of
the IMDMA is to "promote the amicable settlement of disputes that have
arisen between parties to a marriage., 284 A second relevant purpose of the
LMDMA is to "mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children
caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage., 285 Finally, section
102 provides that a purpose of the IMDMA is to "secure the maximum
involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral, and emotional well-being of the children during and after the
litigation. 2 86
The IMDMA also provides for voluntary agreements between parties
to a marriage upon dissolution, stating that divorcing parties may enter into
a written or oral agreement containing provisions for, inter alia, support,
custody, and visitation, of their children.287 Such agreements are generally
encouraged for the purpose of "promoting the amicable settlement" of marUnless the parties otherwise stipulate, the
riage dissolution actions. 8
terms of the private agreement "shall be set forth in the judgment and the
parties ordered by the court to perform under such terms. ' 289 However, the
significant degree.
See generally Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 219 (interpreting the applicable IMDMA
281.
provisions to require that section 609 controls in joint custody cases and where private
agreements limiting relocation are in place).
See generally Creeden, 615 N.E.2d at 24 (establishing that best interest test is to
282.
be applied to all relocation cases).
283.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102 (2002).
284.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(3) (2002).
750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/102(4) (2002).
285.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(7) (2002).
286.

287.

288.
289.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(a) (2002).

See id.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(d) (2002).
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IMDMA provides that agreements specifying terms for the support, custody, and visitation of minor children are not binding on the court.
The absence of a written relocation law that provides for specific
treatment of relocation where a joint custody/shared parenting arrangement
or a stipulation limiting the right to relocate is in place represents a failure
to acknowledge that the goal of facilitating settlement is fundamental to
both the IMDMA and sound public policy. The vast majority of custody
determinations are made as a result of settlement.29 1 Parties may choose to
settle the issue of custody for any number of valid reasons, which may or
may not include a factual analysis of which party is per se the better parent.292 These reasons include the desire to exercise more control over custody and visitation arrangements, 293 the desire to reduce legal CoStS, 2 94 a
need to reach an expedient resolution to the case,295 or the desire to facilitate amicable relations after the dissolution.296 Most importantly, settlement may occur because the parties are reluctant to subject their children to
the trauma of custody litigation.297
Joint custody provisions facilitate settlement by allowing parties to receive certain assurances with regard to the upbringing of their children
without litigating the issue of custody. Joint custody gives these assurances
by explicitly defining the rights, responsibilities, and roles of the parties in

290.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(b) (2002).
291.
McGough, supra note 9, at 327 (stating that "the overwhelming majority of
child custody matters are resolved by parental agreement, usually negotiated by lawyers.").
292.
See Jeffery M. Leving with Kenneth A. Dachman, Fathers' Rights, 79-81 (Basic Books 1997). In a chapter entitled "An Honorable Peace," attorney and noted fathers'
rights advocate Leving details the benefits of a negotiated settlement agreement in child
custody cases.
293.
Id. at 82 (noting that "[iun many custody cases, a family court renders a decision
that neither parent finds acceptable.").
294.
Id. at 117 (stating that contested custody cases can cost anywhere from $5,000
for a "bare-bones" fight to $50,000 or more for more complex cases).
295.
Id. at 82 (stating that adversarial custody proceedings may last in excess of two
or three years).
296.
Id. at 83 (pointing out that negotiated settlements allow the children of divorcing couples to more smoothly adjust to their new environment).
297.
The contested custody battle has been universally decried as extremely detrimental to minor children, hindering the rebuilding process with respect to the child's life
after divorce by among other things, diluting family financial resources, straining the child's
relationships with relatives who will often take sides in the dispute and creating uncertainty
in the child's circumstances as the often long and protracted judicial proceedings take place.
Contested custody battles have been likened to "Armageddon," with respect to their all or
nothing form and their destructive results. See McGough, supra note 9, at 329. See generally Andrew S. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1969).
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a joint parenting agreement. 298 In addition, joint custody agreements often
contemplate and require the substantial involvement of the non-custodial
parent in the child's day-to-day life. This involvement may be such that
the non-custodial parent remains on equal footing with the custodial parent
in terms of their status to the child as a psychological parent. 299 In these
circumstances, the appropriate best interest analysis would seem to be the
type of open-ended inquiry that courts undertake in an initial custody determination, as distinguished from the relocation-specific Eckert analysis. 3° ° Unfortunately, Illinois relocation law, as expressed in section 609

and in case precedents, does not appear to make any distinction in the nacustody scenarios and the
ture of the court's inquiry as between shared
3
01
arrangements.
custody
sole
more common
Provisions in marital settlement agreements that limit the right to relocate also facilitate the settlement of custody disputes. When the parties
agree as to where a child will be raised, and such agreement is reflected in
an enforceable court order, both the custodial and non-custodial parents can
make long-term plans with respect to their living arrangements, careers,
and other matters based on the premise that such plans will not arbitrarily
be disrupted by the relocation of their child. The receipt of reasonable assurances as to a child's domicile presumably would minimize the need for
some parents to engage in destructive, all-or-nothing, litigation over the
issue of custody. 3°2 Thus, when divorcing parties can agree on the issue of

298.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.1(b) (2002) (stating that joint custody means
custody pursuant to a Joint Parenting Agreement which specifies each parents' powers,
rights, and responsibilities for the personal care of the child).
Richards, supra note 273, at 264 (stating that in cases of "equally shared physi299.
cal custody, both parents would be significant psychological parents, thus obviating the
justification for a presumption in favor of relocation based on preserving custodial stability").
See Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 229 (N.J. 2001) ("[The normal removal
300.
inquiry] is entirely inapplicable to a case in which the non-custodial parent shares physical
custody either defacto or de jure ... In those circumstances, the removal application effectively constitutes a motion for change in custody and will be governed initially by a changed
circumstances inquiry"). See also Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 37, at 318 (stating that
"[i]n each case, the child's de facto relationship to both parents, as expressed by the child
and those closest to him or her, should be discerned").
One commentator notes that as shared parenting arrangements become more
301.
common, the issue of removal in this scenario must be addressed by all states. Richards,
supra note 273, at 264.
See Richards, supra note 273, at 273. While Richards argues that private
302.
agreements should not be enforceable, she nonetheless acknowledges that the relocation
restrictions are often key to the non-custodial parent's agreement to the issue of residential
custody.
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domicile, the child's best interests are served because the custody dispute
that may result in the absence of such agreement is avoided. °3
However, the advantages inherent to an agreed resolution on this issue
of custody are diluted when courts in later removal actions ignore prior
stipulations with respect to a child's domicile. First, as the agreement restricting relocation is typically incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, parents may be understandably surprised when the stipulations are not
enforced.3° Second, because negotiated agreements limiting relocation are
non-binding and do not give rise to heightened standards in a subsequent
removal petition, divorcing parents who have sufficient financial resources
may frequently choose to litigate the issue of custody as opposed to pursuing the amicable negotiated settlement that is one of the core goals of the
IMDMA. 30 5 The incentive for potential non-custodial parents to litigate the
issue of custody is compounded when one considers the divergence between the best interests factors employed in Eckert and the section 602
standards employed in general custody determinations. Because Illinois
courts do not treat removal as a material change in circumstances which
would trigger a statutory best interest analysis under the factors set forth in
section 602, 3°6 a parent who wants assurances that he/she will live in the
same state as his/her child may, for tactical reasons deriving from the different factors considered, prefer to litigate the issue of custody at the time
of dissolution as opposed to reaching settlement and contesting a proposed
relocation under section 609.307 This scenario is not conducive to the stated
IMDMA goals of facilitating the "amicable settlement of disputes" and

303.
See McGough, supra note 9, at 329 (detailing the negative consequences to
children that flow from contested custody litigation).
304.
One of the problems with such surprise in this scenario is that it would often
lead to unforeseen litigation in the removal context, as illustrated in Yndestad. 597 N.E.2d
218. Thus, the trauma to the child that was ostensibly averted by settlement of the initial
custody issue is in fact only delayed, resulting in a second disruption for the child.
305.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/102(3) (2002) (stating that the "amicable settlement of
disputes" between divorcing parties is an IMDMA goal).
306.
Yndestad, 597 N.E.2d at 218.
307.
See James, supra note 10, at 51 (stating that practitioners in Pennsylvania,
where the best interests tests in custody and relocation matters also differ, may want to
advise potential non-custodial parents to seek shared custody in every case possible to avoid
the "trap" where stipulation on the issue of primary residential custody could severely affect
the ability of an involved non-custodial parent to contest a proposed relocation. This scenario would also seem to be in play currently in Illinois, as the unwillingness of courts to
consider relocation a substantial change in circumstances, or meaningfully expand the
Eckert analysis into other relevant best interests inquiries, would seem to place a fit and
involved parent in a better position in an initial custody determination than they would hold
in a relocation action).
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mitigating the potential harm to children caused by the legal dissolution of
marriage.
This comment does not suggest that custody arrangements or relocation restrictions resulting from settlement agreements should be binding on
the court or override the best interests of the child. It is a basic tenet of
family law that private agreements speaking to custody issues do not bind
trial courts, as the best interests of the child control.3 °8 However, the terms
of private agreements 3°9 and joint custody orders 310 can and should have a
role in relocation cases, as they represent court-endorsed judgments by the
parents at the time of dissolution as to whether interstate relocation is
against the best interests of the child. One way that private agreements and
joint custody can play a role in best interests analysis is by creating a rebuttable presumption as to whether allowing or prohibiting relocation is in the
child's best interests. 31 1 This approach is utilized by states such as Arizona
and Vermont.312 Adding a similar provision to section 609 would retain the
trial court's ability to act in the best interests of the child while at the same
time providing for formal consideration of agreements reached by parents
at the time of the divorce. Such a provision would encourage parents to
reach privately negotiated settlements with regard to custody and thus facilitate the goals of the IMDMA.
B.

A NEW ROADMAP: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REVISION OF SECTION

609

The Illinois General Assembly would serve the interests of divorcing
parents and their children by revising section 609 of the IMDMA. A good
starting point for an amended relocation statute would be to define specific

308.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(b) (2002).
309.
Janet Bulow and Steve Gellman, two of the earliest advocates for the allowance
of liberal relocation privileges for custodial parents, acknowledged an exception in circumstances where the custodial parent agreed to a residence restriction at the time of the divorce. Janet Bulow & Steve Gellman, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REV. 949, 973-74 (1983). See also McGough, supra note 9, at 295
(relocation issues should be resolved by the parents themselves, as they are in the best position to determine their child's best interests); See also Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation:
Moving Forwardor Moving Backward, 31 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 983, 1026 (2000) (suggesting
that the fixing of domicile by agreement of the parties at the time of the divorce or by order
of the court could be construed as a determination that it is in the best interests of the child
to remain in that domicile).
310.
Richards, supra note 273, at 264 (suggesting that a model relocation statute
should differentiate between sole custody arrangements and cases involving shared physical
custody).
311.
See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-408 (2003).
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-408 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666 (2003).
312.
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factors for courts to consider in making best interests of the child determinations in relocation actions. At the very least, such factors would represent a legislative judgment as to the policies of the state of Illinois with
regard to relocation. A solid first step for the Illinois General Assembly in
drafting a new relocation statute would be to incorporate the eight best interests factors set forth in the Model Relocation Act, as proposed by the
American Association of Matrimonial Lawyers in 1998. 3' 3 The Model Act
proposed the following eight factors for consideration in relocation cases:
1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration
of the child's relationship with the person proposing to relocate and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and
other significant persons in the child's life;
2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and
the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's
physical, educational, and emotional development, taking
into consideration any special needs of the child;
3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between
the non-relocating person and the child through suitable
visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties;
4) The child's preference, taking into account the age and
maturity of the child;
5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of the
person seeking the relocation, either to promote or thwart
the relationship between the child and the non-relocating
person;
6) Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the
general quality of life for both the custodial party seeking
relocation and the child, including but not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or opportunity;
7) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the
relocation;
8) Any other factor affecting the best interests of the
child.

313.
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Proposed Model Relocation Act:
An Act Relating to the Relocation of the Principal Residence of a Child, 15 J. AM. AcAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1998).
314.
Id.
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The factors set forth in the Model Act would constitute an appropriate
combination of the best interests factors utilized under the general custody
provisions set forth in IMDMA section 602 and the factors that are considered under Eckert. The factors are child-centered, yet focused on evaluating the effects of proposed relocation on the child as opposed to relitigating custody. The Model Act leaves in place the Eckert test's examinations of parental motives and benefits to the custodial parent and child,
while also giving appropriate weight to the child's interests by considering
the wishes of the child, the nature and duration of the child's relationships
with individuals significantly involved in the child's life, and the impact of
the relocation on the child. Adoption of these or similar standards would
provide for a more complete and precise determination of the best interests
of the child in Illinois relocation cases.
In addition, an amended section 609 should also define the effect of
joint custody and agreed provisions limiting relocation. To facilitate "the
amicable settlement of disputes" and to mitigate the potential harm to children and parents caused by the marriage dissolution process, an amended
relocation statute should create a rebuttable presumption that mutually
agreed upon terms in a joint parenting agreement that relate to relocation
reflect the best interests of the child. The Arizona relocation statute could
serve as a model with respect to this provision. Arizona's statute provides
that "there is a rebuttable presumption that a provision from any parenting
plan or other written agreement is in the child's best interests. 31 5
Amending section 609 in this manner would provide Illinois with a relocation statute that allows for a thorough best interests determination
while placing appropriate emphasis on the terms of joint custody arrangements and parenting agreements. Such revisions would promote the best
interests of children and facilitate the underlying policies the IMDMA.
V.

CONCLUSION

In custody relocation cases there are no easy answers, as trial courts
are given the unenviable task of predicting the future by deciding whether a
proposed move will have a positive or negative effect on a child. However,
the risk of a custody relocation case ending in a poor decision with devastating consequences can be reduced by requiring courts to utilize a welldefined set of guidelines that are properly tailored to determining whether a
proposed relocation is in the best interests of the child. These guidelines

315.

ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-408 (2003).

2005]

CHILD CUSTODY RELOCATION

295

should prescribe a child-centered examination of relevant best interests
factors and be consistent with overarching state policies.
The Illinois General Assembly should take steps to ensure that trial
courts decide relocation cases based on principals that are closely attenuated to the best interests of the child, congruent with the policies of the
IMDMA, and conducive to the amicable settlement of marriage dissolution
and child custody litigation. Defining specific best interests guidelines for
courts to employ in relocation actions would allow for a more precise
analysis that is based on factors reflective of legislative judgment. Such
specific guidelines would better facilitate the just resolution of relocation
cases and thus serve the best interests of children, parents, lawyers, and
judges in Illinois.
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